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I. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND NATURE 
OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 
3, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, and Section 78-2-2, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. 
Plaintiff and Respondent Bud Leach ("Leach"), commenced this 
action to recover the amount due him under a promissory note (the 
"Leach Note") signed by Weldon L. Daines ("Daines"), J. R. Willyard 
("Willyard") and Sheldon Player ("Player"). Liability for the note 
was expressly assumed by Appellant, Kenneth K. Knight ("Knight"). 
Knight filed a second action, civil no. 87-7445, contending he had 
been fraudulently induced by Daines to assume the Leach Note and 
was entitled to rescind the agreement. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review on Knight's 
appeal of the Judgment in favor of Leach: 
1. Is Knight entitled to raise for the first time in his 
Brief the claim that the district court erred in instructing the 
jury that Knight was required to commence this action within three 
years after Knight discovered, or through the exercise of 
reasonable care, should have discovered, the fraud or his claim was 
barred by the statute of limitations? 
2. If Knight is entitled to raise this claim for the first 
time in his Brief, was the instruction described in paragraph 1 
above incorrect? 
3. In any event, did the statute of limitations instruction 
constitute prejudicial error in view of the fact that the jury 
determined that Knight had not been defrauded? 
4. Was Knight entitled to rescind his agreement to pay the 
Leach Note in view of the fact that Knight had sold 41% of his 
interest in the hotel so he could not restore the parties to the 
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status quo? 
5. Is Leach entitled to recover attorneys1 fees incurred on 
this appeal? 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Leach commenced this action seeking to recover the amount due 
him on the Leach Note executed by Daines, Player and Willyard on 
June 10, 1980. Recovery was sought from Knight on the basis that 
he had expressly assumed liability for payment of the Leach Note 
by virtue of an agreement dated November 15, 1983. Approximately 
a year and a half after Leach filed the original Complaint in this 
case and shortly after Knight had obtained a continuance of the 
original trial date, Knight filed a second action, civil no. 87-
7445, against Daines, Willyard, Player and Leach, contending that 
he had been defrauded by Daines into assuming the obligation owed 
to Leach on the Leach Note, and was therefore entitled to rescind 
that agreement. The cases were consolidated. After the trial was 
continued a second time for several months at the request of 
Knight, the case finally went to trial before a jury on August 22, 
1988. 
Player and Willyard did not appear at trial, and Default 
Judgments were entered in favor of Leach. Also, a Directed Verdict 
was entered in favor of Leach against Daines on the Leach Note. 
After a four day jury trial, the jury answered special 
interrogatories in which it determined that Knight had not been 
defrauded into agreeing to assume all liability to Leach on the 
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promissory note. Judgment was thereafter entered on October 11, 
1988, in favor of Leach on the promissory note against Knight, 
Daines, Player and Willyard in the sum of $227,939.53. It is from 
this judgment that Knight appeals. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
On June 10, 1980, Daines, Willyard and Player signed the Leach 
Note in the amount of $274,222.50. Leach had previously had 
discussions with Daines about becoming a partner with Daines, 
Willyard and Player in the Rock Springs Hilton Hotel being 
constructed in Rock Springs, Wyoming. Leach advanced money with 
respect to the development of the hotel. When he did not become 
a partner, his advances got converted to the Leach Note. [R. 
Tr.Vol. 1, pp. 31-35; 44-47; Ex. 1] 
The Leach Note was payable in monthly payments of $5,000.00. 
The payments were made on a timely basis for over three years. [R. 
Tr.Vol. 1, pp. 28-29; 48; Ex. 3] In November 1983, Knight entered 
into agreements with Willyard, Player and Daines, pursuant to which 
Knight acquired the controlling interest in the hotel and took over 
management of the hotel. In connection with these agreements, 
Knight expressly agreed to assume and pay the obligation owing to 
Leach on the Leach Note. [R. Tr.Vol 1, pp. 48-51; Ex. 6] 
Only one $5,000.00 payment was made on the Leach Note after 
Knight assumed the obligation to pay it. [R. Tr.Vol 3, p. 74] 
Thereafter, during early and mid-1984, Knight informed Leach's 
counsel that the hotel was having trouble and he was unable to make 
the $5,000.00 payments, but that he would make monthly interest 
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only payments while he was trying to turn the hotel around. [R. 
Tr.Vol. 3, p. 75] Knight did, in fact, make monthly interest only 
payments of approximately $1,638.00 per month covering a period of 
approximately two years. Knight made no claim during this period 
of time that he had been defrauded or wasn't liable on the Leach 
Note. In fact, during late 1984, Knight tried to persuade Leach 
to take an interest in the hotel in lieu of the amount owing on the 
Leach Note and represented to Leach the hotel was making thousands 
of dollars each month. In fact, the hotel was not doing well. 
Knight eventually stopped making payments in early 1986, solely 
because the hotel didn't have the money, and this lawsuit was 
filed. [R. Tr.Vol. 3,pp. 81-83; 86-91; Exs. 3, 10, 11. 12 and 47] 
Some months after the lawsuit was filed, Knight contended for 
the first time that he was not liable to pay the Leach Note because 
he had been defrauded by Daines into assuming liability by 
misrepresentations by Daines concerning the financial condition of 
the Rock Springs Hotel. [R. Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 81-83] 
Leach denied that Knight had been defrauded or that he was 
entitled to rescind his agreement to pay the Leach Note. Leach 
further contended that Leachfs fraud claim and request for 
rescission was barred because it had not been filed within three 
years after the fraud was discovered or should have been 
discovered, and that, in any event, Knight could not rescind 
because he had not acted promptly to do so after he knew or should 
have known of the alleged fraud. 
The jury determined, in response to special interrogatory no. 
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1, that Leach had not been defrauded. [R. Tr.Vol. 4, p. 165] The 
jury did not reach the question posed by special interrogatory 4 
as to when Knight discovered, or, through the exercise of 
reasonable care, should have discovered, the alleged fraud of 
Daines. Nor did the jury reach the question posed by interrogatory 
no. 3 as to whether Knight was entitled to rescind the agreement 
by which he agreed to pay the obligation owed to Leach on the 
promissory note. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Knight is not entitled to raise for the first time in his 
Brief the issue of whether the instruction concerning the statute 
of limitations given by the court that Knight was required to 
commence an action on the claimed fraud within three years after 
he discovered or should have discovered the alleged fraud was 
correct. Knight's arguments that the Utah statute cannot be 
applied to a resident of Montana and that the statute of 
limitations did not accrue against Leach because Knight was never 
a resident of the state of Utah, were not raised below or in the 
Docketing Statement, and cannot be raised for the first time in 
Knight's Brief. 
2. Even if Knight is entitled to raise the issue concerning 
the statute of limitations instruction, the court's instruction was 
correct. A court will generally apply the forum's statutes of 
limitations. The fact that Knight was not a resident of the State 
of Utah did not serve to toll the statute, nor did Knight request 
an instruction on tolling. 
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3. Even if it is assumed for the purposes of argument that 
the court committed error in giving the instruction concerning the 
statute of limitations, that error was not prejudicial as the jury 
determined that Knight had not been defrauded. The jury did not 
determine one way or another whether the claim was barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
4. Regardless of any other fact, Knight could not escape 
liability on the Leach Note because Knight was not entitled to 
rescind his agreement to pay that Note. Knight had transferred 41% 
of his interest in the hotel so he could not restore the parties 
to the status quo. 
5. Leach is entitled to recover his attorneys1 fees incurred 
on appeal as attorneys1 fees are provided for in the Leach Note. 
V. ARGUMENT 
1. Knight Cannot Raise the Statute of Limitation Issue for 
the First Time in His Brief. 
On page 8 of his Docketing Statement filed on this appeal, 
Knight set forth his only claim on appeal with respect to the Leach 
Judgment: 
It was error for the Court to instruct the jury that 
"Knight was not required to rescind before he became 
reasonably certain of the fraud or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have known of the fraud." 
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, Knight 
takes exception to the underlined provision above. 
The complained of instruction related to Leach's claim that Knight 
could not rescind because he had not elected to do so promptly 
after learning of the alleged fraud. Knight has now abandoned this 
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claim. Knight did not raise as an issue in the Docketing Statement 
whether the instruction concerning the statute of limitations 
instruction was proper. Further, Knight did not contend below, as 
he now does, that the Utah statute of limitations didn't apply or 
that the statute was tolled. Rather, Knight only complained about 
the statute of limitations instruction on the basis that the court 
should not have instructed that the statute began to run when 
Knight should, with reasonable care, have discovered the fraud. 
[R. Tr.Vol. 4, p. 163] Knight is precluded from making these new 
claims for the first time in his Brief. Franklin Financial v. New 
Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). 
2. The Court's Instruction Concerning the Statute of 
Limitations Was Correct. 
The court instructed the jury that: 
A party claiming to have been defrauded must file 
a lawsuit within three years after he discovered or 
through the exercise of reasonable care should have 
discovered, the fraud or his claim is barred by the statute 
of limitations. 
[Instruction no. 27; R. 535] 
Knight wrongly claims this instruction was improper because 
the Utah statute of limitations should not be applied and because 
the statute was supposedly tolled as Knight was never a resident 
of Utah. These arguments are without any merit. 
First, the district court properly applied the Utah statute 
of limitations for fraud. Where, as here, a general statute of 
limitation is involved, courts apply the forum's statute of 
limitations. See, e.g. , Sobo v. Sobo, 626 P.2d 520, 521 (Wash. 
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1981); Eschenhagen v. Zika. 696 P.2d 1362, 1365 (Ariz. 1985); Green 
v. Kensinger, 429 P.2d 95 (Kan. 1967); 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of 
Actions Sec. 66. This rule is especially applicable in the present 
case since Knight never requested the trial court to apply the 
statute of limitations of any other state. 
Second, the fact that Knight was never a resident of the state 
of Utah does not operate to toll the statute of limitations. Utah 
Code Annot., Sec. 78-12-35, upon which Knight relies, only provides 
that if a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out 
of the state, the statute of limitations does not commence to run 
until after his return to the state, or, if a person leaves the 
state after the statute of limitations commences running, the 
statute is tolled during his absence from the state. The fact that 
Knight, the person making the claim, was not a resident of Utah, 
is not a basis for tolling the statute. Nor did Knight request an 
instruction on tolling. 
3. Even if the Statute of Limitations Instruction Was 
Erroneous, it Did Not Constitute Prejudicial Error. 
Even if, contrary to what is argued above, the court erred in 
giving the instruction on the statute of limitations, that 
instruction did not constitute prejudicial error. The simple fact 
of the matter is that neither the court nor the jury determined 
that Knight's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. 
Rather, the jury determined that Knight had not been defrauded. 
Question No.l of the Special Verdict form given to the jury asked: 
Did Daines induce Knight to sign the November 15, 
1983 Memorandum of Understanding Agreement to pay the 
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obligation owing to Leach on the promissory note through 
fraud? [R. Tr.Vol.4, p. 165] 
The jury answered this question, "no". Because the jury answered 
question 1 in the negative, it was not required to answer question 
3 inquiring whether Knight was entitled to rescind the Memorandum 
of Understanding or question 4 dealing with the statute of 
limitations. Accordingly, any instruction concerning the statute 
of limitations was not prejudicial, and does not, therefore, 
constitute a basis for reversing the judgment. See, e.g., King v. 
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); Larsen v. Breitling Bros. 
Constr. Co. , 486 P.2d 1038 (Utah 1978); Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 
170 (Utah 1983) . 
For example, in King v. Fereday, supra, plaintiff complained 
that the trial court had refused to give an instruction concerning 
damages in a negligence action. In affirming the verdict in favor 
of the defendant, the Utah Supreme Court observed: 
We do not, however, consider the propriety of the 
trial court's ruling because any error in the refusal to 
give the instruction was harmless. This Court "may 
reverse a trial court judgment only if there is a 
reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would 
have been a result more favorable to the complaining 
party." [citations omitted] As we have already 
discussed, the jury found defendant not negligent. The 
requested and refused instruction went to the issue of 
damages. Because the jury found a lack of negligence as 
to defendant, the issue of damages became irrelevant. 
Thus, the failure to give the requested instruction, if 
error, was harmless. [739 P.2d at 622] 
In the present case, the jury determined that Knight had not 
been defrauded. Therefore, the issue of whether the fraud claim 
was barred by the statute of limitations became irrelevant. 
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4. Knight Was Not Entitled to Rescind the Agreement to Pay 
the Leach Note, 
Knight's sole claim that he was not required to pay the Leach 
Note was that he was entitled to rescind his agreement to pay that 
Note because Daines had induced him by fraud to sign the agreement 
to pay the Leach Note. The jury determined based upon very 
compelling evidence that Knight had not been defrauded and it was 
clear that Knight's claim of fraud was simply a belated effort to 
escape liability for payment of the Leach Note. However, even if 
it is assumed that Knight was defrauded, that his claim was not 
barred by the statute of limitations and that he had otherwise 
acted timely in giving notice of his intent to rescind, Knight 
would still be barred from rescission. By Knight's own testimony, 
Knight sold a 41% interest in the hotel to Technico Associates and 
Cascade Mall, who were not parties to the lawsuit. [R. Tr.Vol. 3, 
p. 23] Because Knight could not return the interest in the hotel 
which he received in consideration for his agreement to pay the 
Leach Note, Knight was not entitled to rescind that Note. Simpson, 
Handbook of the Law of Contracts, Sec. 201, p. 408 (2d Ed. 1965). 
Therefore, whether or not the statute of limitations instruction 
was correct, Knight could not escape liability on the Leach Note 
and any error was harmless. 
5. Leach is Entitled to Recover His Attorneys' Fees Incurred 
on This Appeal. 
The Leach Note provided for the payment of attorneys' fees to 
Leach in the event of default. Accordingly, Leach is entitled to 
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recover his attorneys' fees incurred on this appeal should the 
Judgment be affirmed. The case should be remanded to the district 
court for a determination of the amount of fees to be awarded on 
the appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that 
the Judgment in favor of Leach should be affirmed, that Leach 
should be awarded his attorneys1 fees incurred on this appeal and 
that the case should be remanded for a determination of the amount 
of fees to be awarded. 
DATED this ^>U~-day of January, 1989. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
STEPHE^^B). MITCHELL 
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